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National Bureau of Economic Research
Crime is a major problem for the United States, creating misery for 
its victims, costing the country substantial resources on the criminal 
justice system and private crime-prevention activities, and turning 
many inner-city neighborhoods into social disasters for residents and 
the rest of the society. Young men, usually out of school young men 
with limited skills and employment or earnings prospects, commit a 
disproportionate number of crimes. Inner-city black youths are the 
most crime-prone group in the society, with other inner-city blacks as 
victims.
From the 1980s through the early 1990s, the number of persons 
incarcerated increased massively, incapacitating many criminals and 
increasing the risks of being caught and penalized for crimes. These 
factors should have greatly reduced the crime rate. Yet the standard 
administrative measure of crime, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports 
(UCR), stabilized in the 1980s. It fell from 1980 to 1984, then rose 
through 1991, then fell modestly through 1993. The standard survey 
measure of victimizations, the National Crime Victimization Survey, 
which typically shows two to four times as much crime as the UCR 
due to crimes not reported to the police, recorded a sizable drop in 
crime, but the declines was far below what could be expected on the 
basis of the incapacitation of so many criminals and the increased risk 
of apprehension and incarceration. Crimes that are best measured— 
murder and auto thefts—showed no sign of falling: murders stabilized, 
while auto thefts increased.
Why has crime remained high? If, in 1976, a political leader had 
announced a tough anti-crime program that would triple the number 
incarcerated and increase the risk of imprisonment for crime, we would 
all have expected drastic reductions in crime rates. But no such drastic 
reductions occurred. The economist naturally seeks an explanation in
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terms of the labor market determinants of the supply of young men to 
crime. For crime to persist at high levels despite massive incarcera 
tions, there must be offsetting increases in the returns to crime or an 
outward shift in the supply schedule of young men due to other factors, 
such as increased drug use, family breakdown, social disorder, etc.
In this paper I explore whether changes in labor market factors may 
explain some of the persistence of high crime in the United States. 
First, I show that participation in crime among American men has 
become so large that crime is an integral part of the lives of many men. 
Then I examine the argument that the 1980s-1990s job market was an 
important factor maintaining the crime rate. I present evidence that 
youths often combine crime and legitimate work and sketch out a "for 
aging" model of the supply of youth to crime that helps explain this 
pattern of behavior. There is a brief conclusion.
Dimensions of Criminal Participation
How many Americans are involved in serious crime? 
A useful identity for examining criminal involvement decomposes 
the number of crimes per capita as follows:
(1) # crimes/population = (# in crime-prone group/population) 
x(# who commit crimes/# in crime-prone group) 
x (# crimes/# who commit crimes).
The first term on the right-hand side of (1) measures the share of the 
population typically involved in crime. For simplicity, I take the crime- 
prone group as consisting of men, disproportionately those aged 
between 18 and 34 years. Despite considerable attention given to the 
effect of the age distribution on crime, changes in this share have had 
only modest effects on the crime rate (Phillips and Votey 1990), so I 
will not focus on demographic developments in this paper.
The remaining terms in (1) reflect the behavior of the crime-prone 
group. The second term is the criminal participation rate—the propor 
tion of the group who commit crimes. The third term is the average 
intensity of criminal activity—the number of crimes committed per 
criminal.
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There are four ways to estimate the criminal participation rate. First, 
administrative records on the number apprehended and convicted of 
crime (and thus "under the supervision of the criminal justice system") 
provide one estimate of the number involved in crime in the recent 
past. The number is a lower bound because it excludes criminals who 
have not been apprehended or who have "beaten the rap." In 1993 
roughly 1 man was incarcerated in the United States for every 50 men 
in the workforce. For every person incarcerated, an additional 2.1 were 
on probation and 0.5 were on parole. This gives a figure of 1 man 
"under the supervision of the criminal justice system" per 15 men in 
the workforce. One in 15 involved in such serious crime as to be under 
supervision? My immediate reaction when I did this calculation was to 
say, I must have made a numerical mistake. The number seems out- 
landishly large. But here are the estimates for 1993: 1
859,400 men in state or federal prison 
428,800 in jail 
1,288,200 total incarcerated
2,690,400 probated after conviction for crime
600,700 on parole 
3,291,100 probated or paroled 
4,579,300 under supervision of criminal-justice system 
69,600,000 male workforce
Since most crimes are committed by younger men (aged 18-34), the 
estimate of the criminal participation rate of young men is even larger: 
1 out of every 9 men aged 18-34 in the United States is under supervi 
sion of the criminal justice system. The figures for blacks are: 1 black 
man in prison for every 11 men in the workforce; 1 black man under 
supervision of the criminal justice system for every 4 men in the work 
force. Combine race and age, and you find the remarkable fact that 37 
percent as many black men aged 18-34 are under supervision of the 
criminal justice system as in the labor force.
These numbers are a decimal place beyond comparable statistics in 
other advanced countries. Since many of the incarcerated are recidi 
vists in crime—studies show percentage re-arrested are on the order of 
50 percent to 70 percent depending on the number of years covered 
(Needels 1993) and have poor employment records years into the
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future (Freeman 1992)—this population can be viewed as a relatively 
permanent part of U.S. society—our equivalent of Europe's long-term 
unemployed. Leaving prison is not like leaving long-term unemploy 
ment—a step back toward a relatively permanent legitimate job. It is 
often simply a return to criminal life until the police apprehend the ex- 
offender again.
The second source of data on criminal behavior is the self-reported 
criminal activity of individuals. These data are possible contaminated 
by reporting bias. If people don't admit to criminal activity, self- 
reported crime would understate criminal participation. If, on the other 
hand, young men think it "cool" to claim to commit crimes, self- 
reported numbers would overstate criminal participation. Criminolo- 
gists have explored these biases through studies that ask people 
whether they had been arrested and then comparing their responses to 
police records. The evidence shows that young white males report 
criminal activity roughly accurately, but that young black males under- 
report criminal participation (Hindelang and Hirschi 1981), possibly 
because criminal involvement among blacks extends beyond "hard 
core" youths. The proportion of young men who admit to committing 
crimes on major surveys ranges from 20 percent to 40 percent (Free 
man 1992).
The third source of data is the number of arrests. To be sure, not 
everyone arrested is guilty of crime, but the number of arrestees does 
indicate the number of persons whom police believe have committed 
crimes—X might be wrongfully arrested but somewhere there is Y 
who in fact committed that crime. The number of arrests in the United 
States is immense. In 1992 there were 9.9 million arrests of men 
(including those under 18) and 2.2 million arrests of men for the 
crimes judged most serious by the FBI index of crimes (U.S. Depart 
ment of Justice, Sourcebook, 1994, table 33). Most of those arrested 
were between the ages of 16 and 44 (85 percent), but a surprising 13.3 
percent of those arrested for serious crimes were aged 13-15. Taking as 
the base population the male civilian labor force in 1992 (69.2 million) 
gives a ratio of arrests per man in the labor force of .14 overall and of 
arrests for index crimes of .032 per man. Since 30 percent of the male 
workforce is 45 or over, the ratio of arrests per labor force participant 
below that age is substantially higher. Using the crime module of the 
National Longitudinal Survey, I calculate that there are 2.3 arrests per
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young man arrested in a given year. Dividing the ratio of arrests per 
man by 2.3 suggests that the number arrested was about 6 percent of 
the male workforce in 1992, and the number arrested for index crimes 
was 1.4 percent of the male workforce.
The fourth source of data on criminal behavior is number of crimes 
committed. From (1), it is apparent that given an estimate of the aver 
age number of crimes per criminal, we could use the number of crimes 
on the UCR or victimization surveys to determine the criminal partici 
pation rate. There are two sources of data on the number of crimes per 
criminal. Some surveys of prisoners ask inmates for detailed histories 
of crimes, arrests, and so on—which can be used to estimate crimes per 
period of time. These surveys yield estimates on the order of 12 to 15 
crimes per year (Piehl and Dilulio 1995). Some surveys of youths, 
including the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), ask sim 
ilar questions of those who are not incarcerated. Using the NLSY, I cal 
culate that the average number of crimes per young man who admitted 
to crime was 6.6. Given the number of crimes presumptively commit 
ted by men, this implies that 2.6 percent as many men committed 
crimes as were in the workforce in 1992.2
Whichever of these estimates one prefers, it is clear that a large pro 
portion of American men, particularly young men, are involved in 
criminal activity.
The Trend in Incarceration and Criminal Propensity
Exhibit 1 shows that from the mid-1970s or so through 1993 the 
number of persons in prison or jail in the United States increased mas 
sively. The rate of increase in the 1980s averaged 8.5 percent per year, 
so that in 1993 there were over three times as many persons in prison 
or jail as in 1976! The combination of an increasing number of crimi 
nals incarcerated and unable to commit crimes and a roughly constant 
UCR crime rate implies that the number of crimes committed by the 
noninstitutional population rose; either criminal participation among 
nonincarcerated men went up, or the number of crimes per criminal 
went up to compensate for the incarceration of so many criminals. The 
falling rate of victimization in the victimization survey could yield a
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contrary conclusion, but in fact the predicted drop in victimizations 
due to incapacitation exceeds the actual drop by so much as to imply a 
large increase in the rate of criminal participation (Freeman 1994).










SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1992. Sourcebook of Crimi 
nal Justice Statistics 1991, pp. 611,636 and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statis 
tics Bulletin by Darrell K. Gilliard and Alien J. Beck. 1994. Prisoners in 1993, June, NCJ- 
147036. 
NOTE: Estimates of jail population before 1983 based on pnson population.
For the period 1977 (prior to the large increase in the jail and prison 
population) to 1992,1 have estimated the trend in criminal activity by 
the noninstitutional population. I calculated the reduction in the number 
of crimes that the increased number of prisoners should have produced 
under hypotheses about the number of crimes the newly incarcerated 
would have committed on the street. Then I compared this expected 
number of crimes to the actual number of crimes in the UCR or victim 
ization survey. The ratio of crimes committed to the predicted number 
gives an index of the Propensity to Commit Crime—a mixture of crim 
inal participation and intensity of criminal activity that reflects the over 
all involvement in crime by the noninstitutionalized population.
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The following example shows precisely how I calculated the index. 
Assume a population of 100, in which there are 40 crimes committed 
per year, giving a crime per person of .40. If each criminal commits 10 
crimes, there are 4 criminals in the population. When the government 
apprehends and imprisons 2 criminals, the number of crimes should, 
all else the same, fall to 20, and crimes per person would fall roughly 
in half, to .204 (= 20/98). Any crime rate beyond .204 implies an 
increase in the index of crime propensity. If 30 crimes were committed, 
the propensity would have risen 50 percent; if 40 crimes were commit 
ted, the propensity would have risen 100 percent. If the number of 
crimes committed per criminal was constant, the criminal participation 
rate must have risen by those amounts. Incapacitation "created oppor 
tunity" for new entrants into crime.
Exhibit 2 gives my estimates of criminal propensity from 1977 to 
1992. Based on UCR data, I assume 10 crimes committed per person 
incarcerated. The calculations indicate that the increase in the prison/ 
jail population should have more than halved the crimes committed per 
male. But between 1977 and 1992 crimes per male rose, albeit mod 
estly. Reconciling these trends, I estimate that the propensity for crimi 
nal activity by noninstitutionalized men increased by 163 percent! My 
suspicion is that most of this rise is due to an increase in the criminal 
participation rate. Also reported in exhibit 2 are similar calculations 
using the victimization data. Because there are more victimizations 
than UCR crimes, I assume the number of victimizations per criminal 
to be 30. In this case, I estimate that criminal propensity increased by 
80 percent from 1977 to 1992. Alternative estimates of crimes per 
incarcerated person would affect the extent of the rise in propensity but 
not its direction.
Exhibit 3 uses supply-demand schedules to show alternative ways to 
account for the upward trend in criminal propensity. The "demand 
curve" in the diagram is not citizens' demand for being mugged, 
robbed, or murdered (though for some crimes, such as drug purchases, 
it could be so interpreted) but a schedule of criminal earnings opportu 
nities. The schedule slopes downward because more criminals presum 
ably reduce the potential rewards from an additional criminal act. The 
supply curve is depicted as a response to criminal earnings; it will shift 
outward if legitimate earnings fall and inward if they increase. In panel 
A, the supply curve of crime is upward sloping. When more criminals
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are imprisoned, the supply shifts inward, which raises the wages of 
criminals. Assuming unchanged criminal opportunities, the only way 
to maintain a given number of crimes is for the noninstitutionalized to 
commit more crimes, shifting the curve back to its original position. 
Panel B shows that an increase in the criminal opportunities curve— 
due, say, to an increased consumer demand for drugs, for instance— 
could have a similar effect, maintaining the number of crimes at higher 
rewards, despite huge incarceration. Panel C gives a qualitatively dif 
ferent picture: the elasticity of supply to crime in this case is infinite 
(presumably because crime pays off much more than legitimate work). 
This means that there is no incapacitation effect on crime: the police 
arrest Joe for dealing drugs on main street and presto! Harry takes 
Joe's old place on the street. Given that economists rarely find infinite 
elasticities, I regard this as an unlikely situation, but it highlights the 
point that the more elastic the labor supply curve the less effect will 
incarceration have on the crime rate.
Exhibit 2. Index of Propensity for Crime, 1977-1992 (1977=1.0)
25
15
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
years
• Uniform Crime Report Index • victimization Index
SOURCE: Calculated by dividing the actual number of crimes by the expected number of crimes, 
where the expected number is estimated by taking the 1977 number of crimes minus the increased 
number of male inmates from 1977 to the given year times the postulated number of crimes that 
inmates would have committed: 10 in the UCR and 30 in the victimisation survey. The graph in 
Freeman (1994) using these data divides the crimes by the male population 16 and over.
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Exhibit 3. Supply of Crime, Criminal Opportunities, and Incapacitation
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In short, economics suggests that we look for an explanation of the 
persistent high level of crime despite mass incarceration in potential 
increases in the rewards to crime and a highly elastic supply curve of 
youths to crime.
Changes in Relative Rewards to Crime
As a first approximation, consider the crime decision as a dichoto- 
mous choice between legitimate and criminal work. The person con 
sidering crime compares the present value of earnings from crime, net 
the loss of earnings due to being apprehended and imprisoned, with the 
present value of earnings from legitimate work; weighs the riskiness of 
crime; and makes his decision. Assuming that the marginal criminal is 
risk-averse, there will be a compensating differential premium from 
crime. The three factors that enter the calculus are legal earnings, risks 
and extent of penalties, and illegal earnings.
From 1973 through the 1990s, the real earnings of the less-skilled 
young men who constitute the bulk of the crime-prone population fell 
sharply. In the 1980s, the position of these men in the earnings distri 
bution also fell as overall income inequality skyrocketed. Moreover, 
despite the putative job-creating effects of pay reductions, their hours 
worked also fell and their employment/population rate fell relative to 
that of the more skilled. The magnitude of the worsened job market 
opportunities for less-skilled young men was sufficiently large—drops 
in real earnings of 20-30 percent, accelerating in the 1990s (Mishel and 
Bernstein 1994)—to have at least potentially raised their propensity to 
choose crime.3
Working in the opposite direction is the increased likelihood that an 
individual involved in crime would be incarcerated in the 1980s. Jus 
tice Department data suggest that the clearance rate for crimes known 
to the police has been relatively constant at about 20 percent (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Sourcebook, 1994, table 4.24). The combination 
of a rising rate of imprisonment, constant clearance rate, and stable 
crime rate implies that those apprehended for crimes were incarcerated 
more frequently or longer. As time in prison has trended-down ward, the 
data imply a greater probability of incarceration upon apprehension for
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crime. Indeed, Langan (1991) estimates that the chance that someone 
who commits a crime would be imprisoned rose for individual crimes 
from 1974 to 1986: for robbery, it increased by 47 percent (from .19 in 
1974 to .28 in 1986); for burglary, by 61 percent (.095 to .153); for lar 
ceny, by 59 percent (.017 to .027); for drugs by 108 percent (table 4). 
Mendel (1995) reports that between 1975 and 1989 the expected prison 
time for a violent crime nearly tripled (p. ii). The increased probability 
of incarceration should, all else the same, lower the present value of 
crime.
What is the net effect on the returns to crime versus legitimate work 
from the increased probability of incarceration upon arrest and the 
reduction in legitimate earnings for crime-prone youths? This is a diffi 
cult question, whose answer depends on the crime, whether or not it 
involves violence as well as property crime, and so on. My back-of- 
the-envelope calculations suggest that the 30 or so percent drop in 
legitimate earnings dominates the increased probability of incarcera 
tion. The largest increase in imprisonment rates shown by Langan is 
.091 for robbery. If the person imprisoned is locked up for 1.25 years 
(median time served before release from prison in 1986 was 15 months 
according to Langan 1991, table 1), the loss in lifetime earnings from 
increased chance of incarceration for robbery would be, roughly, 11 
percent (1.25 x .091). This falls short of the 30 percent drop in real 
earnings from legitimate work. Since time locked up will differ 
depending on repeat offenses, however, and since imprisonment 
reduces future legal employment opportunities and possibly increases 
future illegal opportunities, this is an exceedingly crude calculation. At 
the minimum, however, it suggests that the increased chance of incar 
ceration did not "dominate" the reduction in legitimate earnings in the 
returns to crime calculation.
Although criminal earnings are—for various reasons—difficult to 
estimate, it is difficult to argue that they have fallen in real terms since 
the 1970s.4 The limited evidence that I have examined suggests the 
opposite, at least for youth. This information consists of responses to 
survey questions on perceived criminal and legitimate earnings and 
employment opportunities at the outset of the 1980s and at the end of 
the decade. In 1980 the NBER Inner City Youth Survey asked youths in 
Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia whether they thought they could 
make more "on the street" than in a legitimate job. It also asked them
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about their perceptions of the availability of criminal opportunities. 
The 1989 Boston Youth Survey, conducted at the peak of the booming 
"Massachusetts Miracle" job market, asked the same questions. 
Between these dates, the proportion of youths who reported that they 
could earn more on the street went up, from 31 percent in the three cit 
ies and 41 percent in Boston in 1980 to 63 percent in Boston in 1989. 
Similarly, the proportion who said they had "chances to make illegal 
income several times a day" roughly doubles over the period, to reach 
nearly 50 percent in 1989 (Freeman 1992).
Consistent with this, youths who made money from crime in the 
1980 NBER Survey of Inner City Youth reported average annual crimi 
nal earnings of $1,807 per year, whereas in the 1989 Boston Youth Sur 
vey youths reported average criminal earnings of $3,008—which, 
deflated, implies a real increase of some 5 percent. 5 These annual crim 
inal earnings are, the reader will note, hardly large numbers. Even 
those who said they committed crimes weekly in 1989 reported earn 
ings of $5,376 over the year—hardly the stuff of riches. Still, trans 
formed into "hourly pay," these figures imply hourly earnings from 
crime of around $10.00 for criminal activity in Boston in 1989. This 
exceeds the $7.50 youths reported from legitimate work and substan 
tially exceeds take-home pay from legitimate work, after social secu 
rity and tax deductions. Estimates of earnings for adult criminals tell a 
similar story. Reuter surveyed drug dealers in Washington, D.C. and 
found that they earned $2,000 per month net of expenses, which he 
translated into $30.00 per hour, making drug selling "much more prof 
itable on an hourly basis than are legitimate jobs available to the same 
person" (Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990, p. viii). He further esti 
mated that the illegitimate earnings of drug dealers exceeded their 
legitimate earnings by enough to make it financially worth their while 
to spend one year in jail for every two years they sold drugs. In the 
1986 Inmate Survey I found that criminals who said all of their earn 
ings came from crime made $24,775 per year (Freeman 1993), a figure 
comparable to Reuter's $2,000 a month; but so few criminals reported 
that all their earnings were from crime, this is an unrepresentative sta 
tistic. Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) stress that criminal earnings from 
burglary/theft, robbery, and swindling are not that high and may fall 
short of the legitimate earnings available to those criminals (though not 
necessarily on an hourly basis).
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My bottom-line assessment is that the returns to crime increased rel 
ative to those from the job market for crime-prone less skilled men in 
the 1980s, and that the hourly rewards to crime exceeded the hourly 
rewards from work. Assuming this to be the case, the next question is 
whether the magnitude of supply response to the change in returns is 
large enough to have contributed significantly to the observed trends.
Supply Responses
There are five pieces of evidence that suggest that supply responses 
may be sufficiently large to play a role in the rise in criminal propen 
sity.
1. The demographics of the criminal population
Those who commit crimes consist disproportionately of persons 
with low legitimate earnings prospects—the young, the less-educated, 
persons with low test scores, etc. As long as these people do not have 
commensurately lower criminal earnings prospects and as long as they 
respond to differential legal/illegal incentives, this distribution is quali 
tatively what virtually any labor supply model would predict. In fact, 
evidence from the NLSY suggests that greater schooling, age, and test 
scores pay off more in the normal job market than in crime, so that the 
observed demographics of the criminal population is consistent with 
differing rewards for characteristics and responses by individuals to 
those characteristics.6
2. The estimated effect ofjoblessness on crime
Literature reviews (Chiricos 1987; Freeman 1983, 1994) find that 
higher unemployment is associated with greater crime. Most studies 
comparing crime rates and unemployment rates across areas find that 
high unemployment areas have high crime rates, though coefficients of 
response are not large, and an occasional study finds little relation. 
Most time series studies also find that unemployment or related mea 
sures of aggregate labor market activity are associated with rises in 
crime, but cyclical changes in labor market tightness cannot explain 
secular changes in criminal propensity. Perhaps most striking, compar 
isons of individuals show that those who commit crimes are more 
likely to do so when they are unemployed. This is consistent with a
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joblessness effect on crime though it could simply reflect the timing of 
criminal behavior. Finally, longitudinal evidence on the correlates of 
violent criminal behavior over time shows that persons who have 
engaged in "serious violent behavior" are more likely to terminate this 
if they are employed than if they are unemployed (Elliot 1994, table 1).
3. Estimates of the effect of inequality on crime
Some studies have explored the relation between inequality in a 
geographic area and the rate of crime. Given that criminals are low- 
skilled, greater inequality is a plausible indicator of the rewards to 
crime (robbing the wealthier) compared to low-skill work. Most stud 
ies find that more inequality is associated with more crime (see the 
reviews by Chiricos 1987; Freeman 1983, 1994). Land, McCall and 
Cohen (1990) even report that homicide rates are correlated with mea 
sures of inequality across cities. In the most comprehensive work to 
date, Lee (1993) found a substantive positive relation between inequal 
ity and crime rates across SMSAs in 1970 and 1980. His estimated 
effect of inequality on crime suggests that the increased inequality in 
the 1980s induced a 10 percent increase in the UCR, which falls far 
short of the observed rise in the propensity to commit crime in figure 2. 
When Lee compared changes in inequality and crime among SMSAs, 
however, he found no relation, possibly because of the decreased sig 
nal-to-noise ratio in changes in inequality, but also possibly because 
the cross-area relation reflects an omitted area variable rather than a 
true inequality-crime link.
4. Estimates of the crime behavior of individuals
Studies that examine the effects of incentives on the criminal behav 
ior of individuals are potentially the most compelling. In the first such 
major study in economics, using the NBER Inner City Youth Survey, 
Viscusi (1986) found that perceptions of risk combined with earnings 
opportunities influence the supply of young blacks to crime. Using the 
same data, I found a significant positive relation between criminal par 
ticipation and whether individuals perceived that they could earn more 
on the street than in the job market (1987). More recently, Grogger 
(1994) estimated an econometric model of the crime behavior of young 
men in the NLSY that makes extensive use of the fact (to be examined 
shortly) that many youths who engage in crime also work. His esti 
mated supply elasticity to crime is roughly unity: a 10 percent decrease 
in the real wages of youths would increase their crime rate by nearly 10
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percent. Applying this elasticity to the observed drop in real earnings 
of less-skilled young men, he predicts a 23 percent increase in crimes 
committed by these youths from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, 
which he points out is of comparable magnitude to the 18 percent 
increase in the index arrest rate for the young over the period.
These studies, particularly Grogger's, should move priors toward the 
job market explanation of the rise in criminal propensity. But none of 
the studies are smoking guns. Viscusi and Grogger used sophisticated 
structural models—economists' lenses as it were—for viewing the evi 
dence. My analysis used self-reported incentives and could simply be a 
consistency check: yes, people involved in crime thought it paid off 
better than those who did not. Is it possible to provide something 
more?
The NLSY asked one question in its 1980 crime module that can be 
used to examine supply responsiveness to the relative rewards to crime. 
The question asked respondents the proportion of their income that 
came from illegal activity. Holding fixed time worked at legitimate 
jobs, and the number of crimes committed, persons whose income con 
sists disproportionately of illegal earnings will have higher criminal 
pay relative to legitimate pay. They should thus be more deeply 
involved in crime than others, and all else the same, end up incarcer 
ated in the future.7
In the NLSY the proportion of income from illegal sources in 1980 
does in fact help explain incarceration years into the future. Exhibit 4 
documents this claim with a simple linear probability analysis in which 
the dependent variable is being interviewed in jail in 1983, 1986, and 
1989 for a sample of young men who reported some criminal earnings 
in 1980. For simplicity of presentation, I include only two regression 
controls: the numbers of crimes committed and weeks worked in the 
past year. Calculations that include persons who report no criminal 
income or that add additional controls tell the same basic story: the 
higher the relative pay from crime in 1980, the greater the chance a 
young man is incarcerated in ensuing years. The magnitude of the rela 
tive criminal earnings effect varies among the years, seeming to rise 
over time: it averages around 0.10, which given the proportion who go 
to jail (.03) and the mean proportion of income from crime (.20), 
implies an elasticity of supply to relative rewards on the order of 1.5. 
This is in the same ballpark as Grogger's estimate, and implies that the
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decline in the legitimate wages of youths might account for roughly 
one-third of the increased criminal propensity
Exhibit 4. Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Illegal Income on 
Future Incarceration
Jail 1983
Mean of dependent variable
Percentage of income that is illegal, 
1980
Control variables
Number of crimes committed (7100)




































SOURCE: Calculated for sample of out of school youths in NLSY who reported some illegal 
income in 1980.
5. The labor supply behavior of men with falling real earnings Topel 
(1993) and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) have shown that time 
worked by men in the lower deciles of the earnings distribution fell in 
the 1980s as their real earnings fell. This relation has the flavor of a 
labor supply response to falling real earnings. Interpreted in this way, 
they estimate that the elasticity of labor supply on young men in the 
lower deciles of the earnings distribution is on the order of 0.20 to 0.30 
(table 9). While, as I shall shortly document, many youths commit 
crimes while working, and while the supply of time to crime is not the 
simple complement of the supply of time to work, the finding that low- 
paid men worked less as their real wages fell is consistent with the 
claim that as real wages fell these men were more involved in crime.
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Work and Crime: A Foraging Model
Treating the decision to engage in crime as a dichotomous choice 
between legal and illegal work misses an important aspect of criminal 
activity. Because most criminals are self-employed, and because the 
U.S. job market is characterized by considerable mobility and flexibil 
ity, it is easy to combine work with crime at a point in time or to move 
between the two activities over time. Joe holds a job, and mugs and 
robs someone he meets on a dark empty street, sells some drugs on the 
weekend, or steals from his employer. Maybe he sells drugs for a 
while, decides the street is too dangerous, gets a legitimate job for a 
while, loses that job, and goes back to selling drugs. Ethnographic 
research by Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990), Pagan (1991), and 
Hageborn (1994) shows that legal and illegal work often overlap 
among young drug sellers.8
To see how much overlap exists between legal and illegal work, I 
have examined the work activity of persons involved in property crime 
in the NLSY. My analysis supports the view that crime and work are 
not exclusive activities, save possibly for those sufficiently involved in 
crime that they end up in jail or prison in the near future. Exhibit 5 
records the employment status of young men according to four mea 
sures of criminal activity: admitted committing a crime, earning illegal 
income, being charged with a crime, and ending up incarcerated in the 
following year. The sample is limited to out-of-school youths not 
involved in military service. There are differences in employment 
between those involved in crime and those not involved in crime: a 3- 
point difference between those who committed and those who did not 
commit crime; a 7-point difference between those with positive 
incomes from crime and those without such income; a 13-point differ 
ence between those charged with crime and those not charged. But 
these differences are far below the magnitudes that would support a 
crime-employment dichotomy. The only grouping that yields some 
thing close to that is between youths who end up incarcerated a year 
later and the rest of the sample—a 35-point difference in employment.
Ecology models of foraging behavior (Stephens and Krebs 1986) 
offer an insightful way to analyze the tendency for youths to engage in 
both illegal and legal work activities, either simultaneously or by mov 
ing back and forth between them. These models apply economic opti-
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mizing analysis to the problems faced by animals that forage for food. 
The animal must make several decisions in a short period of time: 
whether to "prey" on a particular food source it encounters or turn that 
prey down to search for better prey; whether to exploit opportunities in 
a given patch or search for new opportunities; and so forth. The paral 
lels with youths "foraging" for earnings, legal or illegal, are striking. 
Youths must decide whether to mug someone they meet on the street; 
take a short-term job when they encounter an offer; burgle in the local 
community or try some adjoining area; sell drugs to employees, if 
working, or to customers in a street market.
Exhibit 5. Employment in Survey Week by Criminal Behavior of Out of 
School Non-Military Youth
Employed at survey week 
Criminal group (#of observations)_________1980______
Admitted committing property crime in 1980 survey
Yes (2,369) 70.3 
No (1,847) 73.3
Reported positive illegal income
Yes (952) 66.0 
No (3,265) 73.2
Charged with crime
Yes (744) 58.6 
No (3,279) 71.5
Jail in following year
Yes (46) 30.4
No (4,223)__________________________65.5_____
SOURCE: Tabulated from NLSY, with youths in school coded as missing. In these tabulations I 
have also excluded those in the military. Inclusion of youths in the military reduces the employ 
ment difference between those who reported crime and those who did not (strengthening the argu 
ment in the text) but does not noticeably affect the difference in employment rates for those in jail 
the following year. The admitted crimes figures are based on people who said they committed any 
of the following crimes in the past year: shoplifting, stealing, using force to obtain things, selling 
drugs, conning someone, stealing automobile, breaking into building, aiding gambling operation. 
This leaves out some violent nonproperty crimes. Their inclusion increases the numbers commit 
ting crime without changing the results.
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The foraging models direct attention to differing "reservation 
wages" to various money-making activities and the determinants 
thereof. When returns fall below the reservation wage, the youth will 
reject an opportunity and go on to something different. According to 
the NBER Inner City and Boston Youth surveys, young men in inner- 
city poverty areas encounter many illegal and legal opportunities in a 
relevant time period: McDonald's may be hiring this week; Jones Con 
struction may need a laborer; robbers may need someone to fence sto 
len goods; an elderly woman may wander along the wrong street; a car 
with an expensive stereo system may be parked in an alley. In a world 
where short-run legal and illegal earnings opportunities arrive more or 
less randomly, it is natural for individuals to move between them, com 
mit crimes while working, or take a legitimate job if one happens to be 
available even when engaged in criminal activities. If this hypothesis is 
correct, and the behavior of crime-prone youths is similar to that of for 
aging animals as opposed to that of adults with permanent careers, the 
supply of youths to crime will be quite elastic, consistent with the 
observed failure of incapacitation to reduce crime.
Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that increased incarceration of criminals 
has failed to arrest the nation's massive crime problem because of an 
offsetting increase in the crime propensity of noninstitutionalized men. 
I presented evidence that part of the problem seems to lie with the dete 
rioration of the job market for less-skilled young men. It would be fit 
ting to conclude by offering a program or policy that would improve 
the job prospect of the less skilled, and thus deter crime. While some 
programs for reducing juvenile delinquency have modest beneficial 
effects and some crime prevention programs may work (Mendel 1995), 
I do not believe at this time we have a blueprint for successful job-cre 
ating or job-enhancing programs that would offset the fall in the mar 
ket for the less-skilled and thus reduce crime. What we do have is 
evidence that incarceration, which is highly costly (a year in prison 
costs as much as a year at Harvard, as they say), has not reduced the 
rate of crime (UCR) or has reduced it less than we would have
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expected (victimization survey). The expense of incarceration is such 
that it behooves the nation to experiment with, and study carefully, pro 
grams to enhance the legal earnings opportunities of crime-prone 
young men and to try other modes of crime prevention. Even a mod 
estly successful employment program that induced some to forego 
crime is likely to meet any plausible benefit-cost test, from the savings 
in the cost of incarceration as well as in the lower crime rate.
NOTES
1. The 1993 jail figures are estimated from 1992 data; the numbers probated and paroled are 
estimated from 1990 data. The estimates simply assume that the ratios of the missing data to the 
number in prisons remained constant over time.
2.1 assume that 80 percent of crimes are committed by men, since approximately 80 percent 
of arrests are of males. The number of crimes in 1992 was roughly IS million. Dividing 15 million 
by 69 million men in the labor force and multiplying by 80 percent yields an estimated crime per 
man in the workforce of 0.17. Dividing this by 6.6 gives the figure in the text.
3. The exact magnitude of the decline in real/relative earnings depends on the specific measure 
of earnings chosen, the deflator, years picked, the age and skill group chosen, etc., but it is invari 
ably large.
4. One reason is that most criminals are self-employed, and thus do not face a market wage but 
rather an earnings opportunity schedule in which hourly pay depends on the hours of work they 
choose. In the Boston Youth Survey, those who committed a single crime in the past year earned 
$752, whereas those who reported committing crimes once a week or more earned $5,376, or 
$100 or so per week—considerably less per crime. A second reason is that self-reported criminal 
earnings may be inaccurately reported: Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) suggest that the incomes 
that inmates claim to have earned from various crimes are far higher than those crimes could plau 
sibly yield.
5. Here, I take an average of the 1979 and 1980 deflators for the earnings in the Inner City Sur 
vey, since the survey covered both years. Using the 1979 deflator gives an estimated 3 percent 
drop in earnings, which is far short of the drop in legitimate earnings.
6. Since criminal earnings are poorly measured, it is not easy to document this claim. In the 
NLSY I regressed the share of income from illegal sources on number of crimes reported, weeks 
worked in the year and three human capital measures: years of schooling, age, and AFQT score. 
The coefficients on all three human capital measures were negative and significant, implying that 
schooling, age, and AFQT lowered illegal income relative to legal income.
7. Because the NLSY has never repeated the crime module, evidence on future crime behavior 
is limited to whether or not the respondent was interviewed in jail or prison.
8. The "doubling up" of legal work and cocaine sales in the Pagan and Reuter, MacCoun and 
Murphy studies indicates that for many young men, illegal work may be temporary or transitional 
work that supplements difficult low-wage or otherwise unsatisfactory work. For others, legal work 
provides options to riskier illegal work, or perhaps broadens markets for sellers of illegal goods or
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